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Abstract
Differential privacy is a mathematical framework for privacy-preserving data anal-
ysis. Changing the hyperparameters of a differentially private algorithm allows one
to trade off privacy and utility in a principled way. Quantifying this trade-off in
advance is essential to decision-makers tasked with deciding how much privacy
can be provided in a particular application while keeping acceptable utility. For
more complex tasks, such as training neural networks under differential privacy, the
utility achieved by a given algorithm can only be measured empirically. This paper
presents a Bayesian optimization methodology for efficiently characterizing the
privacy–utility trade-off of any differentially private algorithm using only empirical
measurements of its utility. The versatility of our method is illustrated on a number
of machine learning tasks involving multiple models, optimizers, and datasets.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy (DP) [13] is the de-facto standard for privacy-preserving data analysis, including
the training of machine learning models using sensitive data. The strength of DP comes from its use
of randomness to hide the contribution of any individual’s data from an adversary with access to
arbitrary side knowledge. The price of DP is a loss in utility caused by the need to inject noise into
computations. Quantifying the trade-off between privacy and utility is a central topic in the literature
on differential privacy. Formal analysis of such trade-offs lead to algorithms achieving a pre-specified
level privacy with minimal utility reduction, or, conversely, an a-priori acceptable level of utility with
maximal privacy. Since the privacy level is generally regarded as a policy decision [37], this step is
essential to decision-makers tasked with balancing utility and privacy in real-world deployments [3].
However, analytical analyses of the privacy–utility trade-off are only available for relatively simple
problems amenable to mathematical treatment, and cannot be conducted for most problems of
practical interest. Further, differentially private algorithms have more hyperparameters than their
non-private counterparts, most of which affect both privacy and utility. In this paper we develop
a Bayesian optimization approach for empirically characterizing the privacy–utility trade-off, and
provide a principled, computationally efficient way to tune any differentially private algorithm.
A canonical application of our methods is differentially private deep learning. Differentially private
stochastic optimization has been employed to train feed-forward [1], convolutional [8], and recurrent
[34] neural networks, showing that reasonable accuracies can be achieved when selecting hyperpa-
rameters carefully. These works rely on the gradient perturbation technique, which clips and adds
noise to gradient computations, while keeping track of the privacy loss incurred. However, these
results do not provide actionable information regarding the privacy–utility trade-off of the proposed
models. For example, private stochastic optimization methods can obtain the same level of privacy in
different ways (e.g. by increasing the noise variance and reducing the clipping norm, or vice-versa),
∗Corresponding author.
Preprint. Under review.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
5.
10
86
2v
2 
 [s
tat
.M
L]
  2
6 J
un
 20
19
and it is not generally clear what combinations of these changes yield the best possible utility for
a fixed privacy level. Furthermore, increasing the number of hyperparameters makes exhaustive
hyperparameter optimization prohibitively expensive.
The goal of this paper is to provide a computationally efficient methodology to this problem by using
Bayesian optimization to estimate the privacy–utility Pareto front of a given algorithm. The Pareto
fronts obtained by our method can be used to find hyperparameter settings leading to the optimal
operating points of any differentially private technique, enabling decision-makers to take informed
actions when balancing the privacy–utility trade-off of an algorithm before deployment. This is in
line with the approach taken by the U.S. Census Bureau to calibrate the level of DP that will be used
when releasing the results of the upcoming 2020 census [17, 3, 2].
Our contributions are: (1) Characterizing the privacy–utility trade-off of an algorithm as a function
of its hyperparameters as the problem of learning a Pareto front on the privacy vs. utility plane
(Sec. 2). (2) Designing DPARETO, a multi-objective Bayesian optimization algorithm for learning
the privacy–utility Pareto front of any differentially private algorithm (Sec. 3). (3) Instantiating and
experimentally evaluating our framework for the case of differentially private stochastic optimization
on a variety of learning tasks involving multiple models, optimizers, and datasets (Sec. 4).
2 The Privacy–Utility Pareto Front
This section provides an abstract formulation of the problem we want to address. We start by
introducing some basic notation and recalling the definition of differential privacy, after which we
will define the key components of our framework. We then formalize the task of quantifying the
privacy–utility trade-off using the notion of Pareto front, and conclude by giving an illustrative
example in the context private logistic regression trained with SGD [44].
General Setup Let A : Zn →W be a randomized algorithm that takes as input a tuple containing
n records from Z and outputs a value in some setW . Differential privacy formalizes the idea that A
preserves the privacy of its inputs when the output distribution is stable under changes in one input.
Definition 1 (Dwork et al. [13], Dwork [12]). Given ε ≥ 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1], we say algorithm A is
(ε, δ)-DP if for any pair of inputs z, z′ differing in a single coordinate we have2
sup
E⊆W
(P[A(z) ∈ E]− eεP[A(z′) ∈ E]) ≤ δ .
To analyze the trade-off between utility and privacy for a given problem, we consider a parametrized
family of algorithms A = {Aλ : Zn → W}. Here, λ ∈ Λ indexes the possible choices of
hyperparameters, so A can be interpreted as the set of all possible algorithm configurations for
solving a given task. For example, in the context of a machine learning application, the family
A consists of a set of learning algorithms which take as input a training dataset z = (z1, . . . , zn)
containing n example-label pairs zi = (xi, yi) ∈ Z = X × Y and produce as output the parameters
w ∈ W ⊆ Rd of a predictive model. It is clear that in this context different choices for the
hyperparameters might yield different utilities. We further assume each configuration Aλ of the
algorithm satisfies DP with potentially distinct privacy parameters.
To capture the privacy–utility trade-off across A we introduce two oracles to model the effect of
hyperparameter changes on the privacy and utility of Aλ. A privacy oracle is a function Pδ : Λ→
[0,+∞] that given a choice of hyperparameters λ returns a value ε = Pδ(λ) such that Aλ satisfies
(ε, δ)-DP. An instance-specific utility oracle is a function Uz : Λ → [0, 1] that given a choice of
hyperparameters λ returns some measure of the utility3 of the output distribution of Aλ(z). These
oracles allow us to condense everything about our problem in the tuple (Λ,Pδ,Uz). Given these
three objects, our goal is to find hyperparameter settings for Aλ that simultaneously achieve maximal
privacy and utility on a given input z. Next we will formalize this goal using the concept of Pareto
front, but we first provide remarks about the definition of our oracles.
Remark 1 (Privacy Oracle). The choice to parametrize our privacy oracle Pδ in terms of a fixed δ
stems from the convention that ε is considered the most important privacy parameter, whereas δ can
2Smaller values of ε and δ yield more private algorithms.
3Due to the broad applicability of DP, concrete utility measures are generally defined on a per-problem basis.
Here we use the conventions that Uz is bounded and that larger utility is better.
2
be interpreted as a small probability that an (ε, 0)-DP guarantee fails. This choice is also aligned with
recent uses of DP in machine learning where the privacy analysis is conducted under the framework
of Rényi DP [35] and the reported privacy is obtained by a posteriori converting the guarantees to
standard (ε, δ)-DP for some fixed δ [1, 19, 34, 16, 43]. In particular, in our experiments with gradient
perturbation for SGD and other stochastic optimization methods (Sec. 4) we implement the privacy
oracle using the moments accountant technique proposed [1] coupled with the tight bounds provided
in [43] for Rényi DP amplification by subsampling without replacement.
Remark 2 (Utility Oracle). Parametrizing the utility oracle Uz by a fixed input is a choice justified
by the type applications we tackle in our experiments (cf. Sec. 4). Other applications might require
variations which our framework can easily accommodate by extending the definition of the utility
oracle. We also stress that since the algorithms inA are randomized, the utility Uz(λ) is a property of
the output distribution of Aλ(z). This means that in practice we might have to implement the oracle
approximately, e.g. through sampling. In particular, in our experiments we use a test set of measure
the utility of a hyperparameter setting by running Aλ(z) a fixed number of times R to obtain model
parameters w1, . . . , wR, and then let Uz(λ) be the average accuracy of the models on the test set.
The Pareto front of a collection of points Γ ⊂ Rp contains all the points in Γ where none of
the coordinates can be decreased further without increasing some of the other coordinates (while
remaining inside Γ).
Definition 2 (Pareto Front). Let Γ ⊂ Rp and u, v ∈ Γ. We say that u dominates v if ui ≤ vi
for all i ∈ [p], and we write u  v. The Pareto front of Γ is the set of all non-dominated points
PF(Γ) = {u ∈ Γ | v 6 u, ∀ v ∈ Γ \ {u}}.
According to this definition, given a privacy–utility trade-off problem of the form (Λ,Pδ,Uz) we are
interested in finding the Pareto frontPF(Γ) of the 2-dimensional set4 Γ = {(Pδ(λ), 1−Uz(λ)) | λ ∈
Λ}. Given this Pareto front, a decision-maker looking to deploy DP has all the necessary information
to make an informed decision about how to trade-off privacy and utility in their particular application.
Example: Logistic Regression To illustrate the ingredients of our framework we consider a simple
private logistic regression model with `2 regularization trained on the Adult dataset [25]. In particular,
to reduce the number of hyperparameters we privatize the model by training with mini-batched
projected SGD and applying a Gaussian perturbation at the output using the method from [44,
Algorithm 2] with default parameters5. The only hyperparameters we tune in this experiment are the
regularization λ and the noise standard deviation σ, while we fix the rest of hyperparameters6. Note
that both hyperparameters affect privacy and accuracy in this case. To implement the privacy oracle
we compute the global sensitivity according to [44, Algorithm 2] and find the ε for a fixed δ = 10−6
using the exact analysis of the Gaussian mechanism provided in [6]. To implement the utility oracle
we evaluate the accuracy of the model on the test set, averaging over 50 runs for each setting of the
hyperparameters. Given the small number of hyperparameters, we can perform a fine grid search
over λ ∈ [10−4, 1] and σ ∈ [0.1, 10] to obtain the exact Pareto front for this problem. The results are
displayed in Figure 1, where we illustrate privacy and utility as a function of both hyperparameters,
as well as the resulting Pareto front and the corresponding hyperparameter settings.
Threat Model In the idealized setting presented above, the desired output is the Pareto frontPF(Γ),
which depends on z through the utility oracle; this is also the case for the Bayesian optimization
algorithm for approximating the Pareto front presented in Sec. 3. This warrants a discussion about
what threat model is appropriate to consider here.
DP guarantees that an adversary observing the output w = Aλ(z) will not be able to infer too much
about any individual record in z. The (central) threat model for DP assumes that z is owned by a
trusted curator, responsible for running the algorithm and releasing its output to the world. However,
the framework described above does not attempt to prevent information about z to be exposed by
the Pareto front. This is because our methodology is only meant to provide a substitute for using
closed-form utility guarantees when selecting hyperparameters for a given DP algorithm before
its deployment. Accordingly, throughout this work we assume the Pareto fronts obtained with our
method are only revealed to a small set of trusted individuals, which is the usual scenario in an
industrial context.
4The use of 1− Uz(λ) for the utility coordinate is for notational consistency, since we use the convention
that the points in the Pareto front are those that minimize each individual dimension.
5These are the smoothness, Lipschitz and strong convexity parameters of the loss, and the learning rate.
6Mini-batch size m = 1 and number of epochs T = 10.
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Figure 1: Values returned by the privacy (far left) and utility (center left) oracles across a range of hyperparam-
eters in the logistic regression example. The Pareto front (center right) and set of corresponding input points
(marked with stars) (far right).
An alternative approach is to assume the existence of a public dataset z0 following a similar dis-
tribution to the private dataset z on which we would like to run the algorithm. Then we can use
z0 to compute the Pareto front of the algorithm, select hyperparameters λ∗ achieving a desired
privacy–utility trade-off, and release the output of Aλ∗(z). In particular, this the threat model being
used by the U.S. Census Bureau to tune the parameters for their use of DP in the context of the 2020
census (see Sec. 5 for more details).
3 DPARETO: Learning the Pareto Front
This section starts by recalling the basic ideas behind multi-objective Bayesian optimization. Then
we describe the proposed methodology to learn the privacy–utility Pareto front and revisit the sparse
vector technique example to illustrate the effectiveness of our method.
Bayesian Optimization for Multiple Objectives Bayesian optimization (BO) [36] is a strategy for
sequential decision making useful for optimizing expensive-to-evaluate black-box objective functions.
It has become increasingly relevant in machine learning due to its success in the optimization of
model hyperparameters [41, 21].
In its most standard form, BO is used to find the minimum of an objective function f(λ) on some
subset Λ ⊆ Rd of a Euclidean space of moderate dimension. It works by generating a sequence of
evaluations of the objective at locations λ1, . . . , λk, which is done by (i) building a surrogate model
of the objective function using the current data and (ii) applying a pre-specified criterion to select a
new location λk+1 based on the model. In the single-objective case a common choice is to select the
location that, in expectation under the model, gives the best improvement to the current estimate [36].
In this work, we use BO for learning the privacy–utility Pareto front. When used in multi-objective
problems, BO aims to learn the Pareto front with a minimal number of evaluations, which makes it
an appealing tool in cases where evaluating the objectives is expensive. Although in this paper we
only work with two objective functions, we detail here the general case of minimizing p objectives
f1, . . . , fp simultaneously. This generalization could be used, for instance, to introduce the running
time of the algorithm as a third objective to be traded off against privacy and utility.
Let λ1, . . . , λk be a set of locations in Λ and denote by V = {v1, . . . , vk} the set such that each
vi ∈ Rp is the vector (f1(λi), . . . , fp(λi)). In a nutshell, BO works by iterating over the following:
1. Fit a surrogate model of the objectives f1(λ) . . . , fp(λ) using the available dataset D =
{(λi, vi)}ki=1. The most standard approach is to use a Gaussian process (GP) [38].
2. For each objective fj calculate the predictive distribution over λ ∈ Λ using the surrogate model.
If GPs are used, the predictive distribution of each output can be fully characterized by their
mean mj(λ) and variance s2j (λ) functions, which can be computed in closed form.
3. Use the posterior distribution of the surrogate model to form an acquisition function α(λ; I),
where I represents the dataset D and the GP posterior conditioned on D.
4. Collect the next evaluation point λk+1 at the (numerically estimated) global maximum of α(λ; I).
The process is repeated until the budget to collect new locations is over. There are two key aspects of
any BO method: the surrogate model of the objectives and the acquisition function α(λ; I).
In this work we used independent GPs with a transformed output domain to model each objective,
but generalizations with multi-output GPs [4] are possible (see Appx. E).
4
Acquisition with Pareto Front Hypervolume Next we define an acquisition criterion α(λ; I)
useful to collect new points when learning the Pareto front. Let P = PF(V) be the Pareto front
computed with the objective evaluations in I and let v† ∈ Rp be some “anti-ideal” point7. To measure
the relative merit of different Pareto fronts we use the hypervolume HVv†(P) of the region dominated
by the Pareto front P bounded by the anti-ideal point. Mathematically this can be expressed as
HVv†(P) = µ({v ∈ Rp | v  v†, ∃u ∈ P u  v}), where µ denotes the standard Lebesgue
measure on Rp. Henceforth we assume the anti-ideal point is fixed and drop it from our notation.
Larger hypervolume means the points in the Pareto front are closer to the ideal point (0, 0). Thus,
HV(PF(V)) provides a way to measure the quality of the Pareto front obtained from the data in V .
Furthermore, hypervolume can be used to design acquisition functions for selecting hyperparameters
that will improve the Pareto front. Start by defining the increment in the hypervolume given a new
point v ∈ Rp: ∆PF (v) = HV(PF(V ∪ {v})) − HV(PF(V)). This quantity is positive only if v
lies in the set Γ˜ of points non-dominated by PF(V). Therefore, the probability of improvement (PoI)
over the current Pareto front when selecting a new hyperparameter λ can be computed using the
model trained on I as PoI(λ) = P[(f1(λ), . . . , fp(λ)) ∈ Γ˜ | I] =
∫
v∈Γ˜
∏p
j=1 φj(λ; vj)dvj , where
φj(λ; ·) is the predictive Gaussian density for fj with mean mj(λ) and variance s2j (λ).
The PoI(λ) function accounts for the probability that a given λ ∈ Λ has to improve the Pareto
front, and it can be used as a criterion to select new points. However, in this work, we opt for the
hypervolume-based PoI (HVPoI) due to its superior computational and practical properties [11]. The
HVPoI is given by α(λ; I) = ∆PF (m(λ)) · PoI(λ), where m(λ) = (m1(λ), . . . ,md(λ)). This
acquisition weights the probability of improving the Pareto front with a measure of how much
improvement is expected computed using the means of the outputs. The HVPoI has been shown to
work well in practice and efficient implementations exist.
Algorithm 1: DPARETO
Input: Λ, Pδ,Uz , v†, k0, k
Initialize dataset D ← ∅
for i ∈ [k0] do
Sample random point λ ∈ Λ
Evaluate oracles v ← (Pδ(λ), 1− Uz(λ))
Augment dataset D ← D ∪ {(λ, v)}
for i ∈ [k] do
Fit GPs to transformed privacy and utility
using D
Obtain new query point λ by optimizing
HVPoI using anti-ideal point v†
Evaluate oracles v ← (Pδ(λ), 1− Uz(λ))
Augment dataset D ← D ∪ {(λ, v)}
return Pareto front PF({v | (λ, v) ∈ D})
The DPARETO Algorithm The main opti-
mization loop of DPARETO is shown in Alg. 1.
It combines the two ingredients sketched so far:
GPs for surrogate modelling of the objective or-
acles, and HVPoI as an acquisition function to
select new hyperparameters. The basic proce-
dure is to first seed the optimization by selecting
k0 hyperparameters from Λ at random, and then
fit the GP models for the privacy and utility or-
acles based on these points. We then find the
maximum of the HVPoI acquisition function to
obtain the next query point, which is then added
into the dataset. This is repeated k times until
the optimization budget is used up. Further im-
plementation details are provided in Appx. E.1.
Now we revisit our example on private logistic
regression with SGD and output perturbation from Sec. 3 to illustrate how GPs can learn a good model
of the privacy and utility oracles from a few random samples and how that produces an acquisition
function to find next hyperparameter settings that improve the current empirical Pareto front. This
corresponds to the initialization phase of DPARETO; results are given in Figure 2.
4 Experiments
We provide experimental evaluation of DPARETO on a number of ML tasks, highlighting the
advantage of using BO over random or grid search, and showcasing DPARETO’s versatility on a
variety of models, datasets and optimizers. Due to space limitations, further details (e.g. optimization
domains and random sampling distributions) and additional results are given in Appx. C and Appx. D.
Datasets We tackle two classic problems: multiclass classification of handwritten digits with the
MNIST dataset, and binary classification of income with the ADULT dataset. MNIST [28] is composed
of 28 × 28 gray-scale images, each representing a single digit 0-9. It has 60k (10k) images in the
training (test) set. ADULT [25] is composed of 123 binary demographic features on various people,
with the task of predicting whether income > $50k. It has 40k (1.6k) points in the training (test) set.
7The anti-ideal point must be dominated by all points in PF(V). See [11] for further details.
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Figure 2: Mean predictions of ε (far left) and utility (center left) using GP models. In white the locations of the
k0 = 50 sampled points are plotted. Empirical and true Pareto fronts (center right) and HVPoI function derived
from GPs to select the next location.
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Figure 3: Far left, center left: Hypervolumes of the Pareto fronts computed by the various models, optimizers,
and architectures on the ADULT and MNIST datasets (respectively) by both DPARETO and random sampling.
Center right: Pareto fronts learned for MLP2 architecture on the MNIST dataset with DPARETO and random
sampling, including the shared points they were both initialized with. Far right: ADULT dataset DPARETO
sampled points and its Pareto front compared to larger set of random sampling points and its Pareto front.
Algorithms Experiments are performed with privatized variants of two popular optimization
algorithms – stochastic gradient descent (SGD) [7] and Adam [22] – although our framework can
easily accommodate other algorithms. For the privatized version of SGD, we use a mini-batched
implementation with clipped gradients and Gaussian noise similar to that of [1], where the only
difference is that we sample mini-batches of a fixed size without replacement instead of sampling
mini-batches from a Poisson distribution with fixed rate, and use the moments accountant from
[43]. Our privatized version of Adam uses the same gradient perturbation technique as SGD. The
pseudo-code for both of these can be found in Appx. B (Alg. 4 and Alg. 5 respectively).
Models For ADULT dataset, we consider logistic regression (LogReg) and linear support vector
machines (SVMs), and explore the effect of the choice of model and optimization algorithm (SGD vs.
Adam), using the differentially private versions of these algorithms outlined in Appx. B. For MNIST,
we fix the optimization algorithm as SGD, but use a more expressive multilayer perceptron (MLP)
model and explore the choice of network architectures. The first (MLP1) has a single hidden layer
with 1000 neurons, which is the same as used by [1] but without PCA dimensionality reduction. The
second (MLP2) has two hidden layers with 128 and 64 units. In both cases we use ReLU activations.
DPARETO vs. Random Sampling A primary purpose of these experiments is to highlight the
efficacy of DPARETO at estimating the privacy-utility trade-off of a given algorithm. As discussed
in above, the hypervolume is a popular measure for quantifying the quality of a Pareto front. We
compare DPARETO to the traditional naïve approach of uniform random sampling by computing the
hypervolumes of Pareto fronts generated by each method.
In Fig. 3, the first two plots show, for a variety of models, how the hypervolume of the Pareto front
expands as new points are sampled. In nearly every experiment, DPARETO’s approach yields a greater
hypervolume than the experiment’s random sampling analog – a direct indicator that DPARETO
has better characterized the Pareto front. This can be seen very clearly by examining the center
right plot of the figure, which directly shows a Pareto front of the MLP2 model with both sampling
methods. Specifically, while the random sampling method only marginally improved over its initially
seeded points, DPARETO was able to thoroughly explore the high-privacy regime (i.e. small ε). The
far right plot of the figure compares the DPARETO approach with 256 sampled points against the
random sampling approach with significantly more sampled points, 1500. While both approaches
yield similar Pareto fronts, the efficiency of DPARETO is particularly highlighted by the points that
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are not actually on the front: nearly all the points chosen by DPARETO are close to the actual front,
whereas many points chosen by random sampling are nowhere near it. We also ran experiments using
grid search, where we chose used grid sizes of 3 or 4 (corresponding to 243 and 1024 points), both of
which performed clearly worse than DPARETO. These are shown in Fig. 8 in Appx. D.
To quantify the differences between random sampling and DPARETO for the ADULT dataset, we
split the 5000 random samples into 19 parts of size 256 to match the number of BO points, and
computed hypervolume differences between the resultant Pareto fronts under the (mild) assumption
that DPARETO is deterministic8. We then computed the two-sided confidence intervals for these
differences, shown in Table 1. We also computed the t-statistic for these differences being zero, which
were all highly significant (p<0.001). This demonstrates that the observed differences between Pareto
fronts are in fact statistically significant. We did not have enough random samples to run statistical
tests for MNIST, however the differences are visually even clearer in this case.
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Figure 4: Left: Pareto fronts for combinations of mod-
els and optimizers on the ADULT dataset. Right: Pareto
fronts for different MLP architectures on the MNIST
dataset.
Algorithm+
Optimizer
Mean
difference 95% C.I.
LogReg+SGD 0.158 (0.053, 0.264)*
LogReg+ADAM 0.439 (0.272, 0.607)*
SVM+SGD 0.282 (0.161, 0.402)*
Table 1: Mean hypervolume differences between BO
and 19 random repetitions of 256 iterations of random
sampling. Two-sided 95% confidence intervals (C.I.)
for these differences, as well as t-tests for the mean,
are included. Asterisks indicate significance at the
p < 0.001 level.
DPARETO’s Versatility The other main purpose of these experiments is to demonstrate the versa-
tility of DPARETO by comparing multiple approaches to the same problem. In Fig. 4, the left plot
shows Pareto fronts of the ADULT dataset for multiple optimizers (SGD and Adam) as well as multiple
models (LogReg and SVM), and the right plot shows Pareto fronts of the MNIST dataset for different
architectures (MLP1 and MLP2). With this, we can see that on the ADULT dataset, the LogReg model
optimized using Adam was nearly always better than the other model/optimizer combinations. We can
also see that on the MNIST dataset, while both architectures performed similarly in the low-privacy
regime, the MLP2 architecture significantly outperformed the MLP1 architecture in the high-privacy
regime. With DPARETO, analysts and practitioners can efficiently create these types of Pareto fronts
and use them to perform privacy–utility trade-off comparisons.
5 Related Work
While this work is the first to examine the privacy–utility trade-off of differentially private algorithms
using multi-objective optimization and Pareto fronts, efficiently computing Pareto fronts without
regards to privacy is an active area of research in fields relating to multi-objective optimization.
DPARETO’s point-selection process most closely aligns with [11], but other approaches (e.g., [45])
may provide promising alternatives for improving DPARETO.
The threat model and outputs of the DPARETO algorithm are closely aligned with the methodology
used by the U.S. Census Bureau to choose the privacy parameter ε for their deployment of DP to
release data from the upcoming 2020 census. In particular, the bureau is combining a graphical
approach to represent the privacy–utility trade-off for their application [17] together with economic
theory to pick a particular point to balance the trade-off [3]. Their graphical approach works with
Pareto fronts identical to the ones computed by our algorithm, which they construct using data from
previous censuses [2]. However, they do not attempt to optimize or learn the Pareto front.
Several aspects of this paper are related to recent work in single-objective optimization. For non-
private single-objective optimization, there is an abundance of recent work in machine learning on
hyperparameter selection, typically using BO [23, 20] or other methods [29] to maximize a model’s
8Whilst this is not strictly true, since BO is seeded with a random set of points, running repetitions would
have been an extremely costly exercise, and we would expect the results to be nearly identical
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utility. Recently, several related questions at the intersection of machine learning and differential
privacy have emerged regarding hyperparameter selection and utility maximization.
One such question explicitly asks how to do the hyperparameter-tuning process in a privacy-preserving
way. Specifically, [27] and subsequently [39] use BO to find near-optimal hyperparameter settings for
a given model while preserving the privacy of the data during the utility evaluation stage. Aside from
the single-objective focus of this setting, our setting is significantly different in that we are primarily
interested in training the models with differential privacy, not in protecting the privacy of the data
used to evaluate an already-trained trained model.
Another question asks how to choose utility-maximizing hyperparameters when privately training
models. When privacy is independent of the hyperparameters, this reduces to the non-private
hyperparameter optimization task. However, two variants of this question don’t have this trivial
reduction. The first variant inverts the stated objective: [30] and [18] each study the problem of
maximizing privacy given constraints on the final utility. The second variant, closely aligning
with the setting in this paper, studies the problem of choosing utility-maximizing, but privacy-
dependent, hyperparameters. This is particularly challenging, since the privacy’s dependence on
the hyperparameters may be non-analytical and computationally expensive to determine. [33, 42]
provide approaches to this variant, however the proposed strategies are 1) based on heuristics, 2) only
applicable to the differentially private SGD problem, and 3) do not provide a computationally efficient
way to find the Pareto optimal points for the privacy–utility trade-off of a given model. [44] provides
a practical analysis-backed approach to privately training utility-maximizing models (again, for the
case of SGD with a fixed privacy constraint), but hyperparameter optimization is naïve performed
using grid-search. By contrast, this paper provides a computationally efficient way to directly search
for Pareto optimal points for the privacy–utility trade-off of arbitrary hyperparameterized algorithms.
The final related question revolves around the differentially private “selection” or “maximization”
problem [9], which asks: how can an item be chosen (from a predefined universe) to maximize a
data-dependent function while still protecting the privacy of that data? Here, [31] recently provided
a way to choose hyperparameters that approximately maximize the utility of a given differentially
private model in a way that protects the privacy of both the training and test data sets. However, this
only optimizes utility with fixed privacy – it doesn’t address our problem of directly optimizing for
the selection of hyperparameters that generate privacy–utility points which fall on the Pareto front.
Recent work on data-driven algorithm configuration has considered the problem of tuning the
hyperparameters of combinatorial optimization algorithms while maintaining DP [5]. In this, problem
instances are sampled from a distribution, and this sample’s privacy is protected. A similar problem
of data-driven algorithm selection is considered by [26], where the problem is to choose the best
algorithm to accomplish a given task while maintaining the privacy of the data used. For both, only
the utility objective is being optimized, assuming a fixed constraint on the privacy.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we introduced DPARETO, a method to empirically characterize the privacy–utility
trade-off of differentially private algorithms. We use Bayesian optimization (BO), a state-of-the-art
method for hyperparameter optimization, to simultaneously optimize for both privacy and utility,
forming a Pareto front. Further, we showed that BO allows us to perform useful visualizations to aid
the decision making process. There are several directions for future work. We focused on supervised
learning, but the method could also be applied to, e.g. stochastic variational inference on probabilistic
models, as long as a utility function (e.g. held-out perplexity) is available. DPARETO currently uses
independent GPs, but an interesting extension would be to use multi-output GPs. While we explored
the effect of changing the model (logistic regression vs. SVM) and the optimizer (SGD vs. Adam) on
the privacy–utility trade-off, it would interesting to optimize over these choices as well. Finally, it
may be of interest to optimize over additional criteria, such as model size or running time.
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A Sparse Vector Technique Analysis
The sparse vector technique [14] is a mechanism to privately run m queries against a fixed sensitive
database and release under DP the indices of those queries which exceed a certain threshold. The
naming of the mechanism reflects the fact that it is specifically designed to have good accuracy when
only a small number of queries are expected to be above the threshold. The mechanism has found
applications in a number of problems, and several variants of the algorithm have been proposed [32].
To illustrate our framework we use a non-interactive version of the mechanism proposed in [32, Alg.
7]. The mechanism is described in Alg. 2, and is tailored to answerm binary queries qi : Zn → {0, 1}
with sensitivity ∆ = 1 and a fixed threshold T = 1/2. The privacy and utility of the mechanism are
controlled by the noise level b and the bound C on the number of answers. Increasing b or decreasing
C yields a more private but less accurate mechanism. Unlike in the usual setting, where the sparse
vector technique is parametrized by the target privacy ε, we modified the mechanism to takes as input
a total noise level b. This noise level is split across two parameters b1 and b2 controlling how much
noise is added to the threshold and to the query answers respectively9. The standard privacy analysis
of the sparse vector technique provides the following closed-form privacy oracle for our algorithm:
P0 = (1 + (2C)
1/3)(1 + (2C)2/3)b−1 (see Appx. A for more details).
Algorithm 2: Sparse Vector Technique
Input: dataset z, queries q1, . . . , qm
Hyperparameters: noise b, bound C
c← 0, w ← (0, . . . , 0) ∈ {0, 1}m
b1 ← b/(1 + (2C)1/3), b2 ← b− b1, ρ← Lap(b1)
for i ∈ [m] do
ν ← Lap(b2)
if qi(z) + ν ≥ 12 + ρ then
wi ← 1, c← c+ 1
if c ≥ C then return w
return w
As a utility oracle we use the F1-score between the vector of true answers (q1(z), . . . , qm(z)) and
the vector w returned by the algorithm. This measures how well the algorithm identifies the support
of the queries that return 1, while penalizing both for false positives and false negatives. This is
again different from the usual utility analysis of sparse vector technique algorithms, which focuses
on providing an interval around the threshold outside which the output is guaranteed to have no false
positives or false negatives [15]. Our measure of utility is more fine-grained and relevant for practical
applications, although to the best of our knowledge no theoretical analysis of the utility of the sparse
vector technique in terms of F1-score is available in the literature.
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Figure 5: Values returned by the privacy (far left) and utility (center left) oracles across a range of
hyperparameters in the sparse vector technique example. The Pareto front (center right) and set of
corresponding input points (marked with stars) (far right).
To illustrate the concepts introduced in Sec. 2 we compute the oracles and Pareto front for Alg. 2. In
our experiment we set m = 100 and pick queries at random such that exactly 10 of them return a 1.
Since the accuracy of the algorithm is sensitive to the order of the queries, to evaluate the privacy
9The split used by the algorithm is based on the privacy budget allocation suggested in [32, Section 4.2].
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oracle we run the algorithm 50 times with a random order in the queries and return the average utility.
Fig. 5 displays the values returned by the privacy and utility oracles across a range of hyperparameters
(left two figures), the Pareto front (center right) and a set of (C, b) pairs that lead to points in the
Pareto front (far right).
In this example we were able to compute the Pareto front of Alg. 2 using a simple grid-search
procedure on a low-dimensional hyperparameter space. However, this approach might not be
computationally feasible in practical applications with more hyperparameters, especially in cases
where each evaluation of the utility oracle requires training a machine learning model – thus motivating
the DPARETO algorithm.
We now illustrate how DPARETO can help to efficiently learn the privacy–utility trade off. In this
example we initialize the GP models with k0 = 250 hyperparameter pairs (Ci, bi). The values of
Ci are sampled uniformly between 1 and 30. The values of bi are sampled uniformly in the interval
[0.1, 100] on a logarithmic scale. The oracle values for ε and the utility are computed for the selected
samples using the same oracles as above. The predicted means of the surrogate models for both
oracles are shown in Fig. 6. We observe that both models achieve a reasonably good prediction
accuracy when comparing directly to the true values in Fig. 5.
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Figure 6: Mean predictions of privacy (ε) (far left) and the utility (1− F1) (center left) using two
GPs models. In white the locations of the sampled points are plotted. Center left: Empirical and true
Pareto fronts. Far right: HVPoI and the selected next location.
Fig. 6 (center right) shows the exact Pareto front of the problem, along with the output values of the
initial sample and the corresponding empirical Pareto front. The empirical Pareto front sits close to
the true one, which indicates that the selection of points (Ci, bi) is already quite good. The goal of
DPARETO is to select new points in the input domain whose outputs will bring the empirical front
closer to the true one. The HVPoI function PoI(λ) is used for this aim. Fig. 6 (far right) shows the
values of the HVPoI for all (C, b) pairs. The maximizer of this function (marked with a star) is used
as the next location to evaluate the oracles. Note that given the current models the HVPoI is making a
sensible choice, selecting a point where ε is predicted to have a medium value while and 1− F1 is
predicted to be low, possibly looking to improve the gap in the lower right corner in the Pareto front
plot.
A.1 Privacy Proof
This section provides a proof of the privacy bound for Alg. 2 used to implement the privacy oracle
P0. The proof is based on observing that our Alg. 2 is just a simple re-parametrization of [32, Alg. 7]
where some of the parameters have been fixed up-front. For concreteness, we reproduce [32, Alg. 7]
as Alg. 3 below. The result then follows from a direct application of [32, Thm. 4], which shows that
Alg. 3 is (ε1 + ε2, 0)-DP.
Comparing Alg. 3 with the sparse vector technique in Alg. 2, we see that they are virtually the same
algorithms, where we have fixed ∆ = 1, Ti = 1/2, ε1 = 1/b1 and ε2 = 2C/b2. Thus, by expanding
the definitions of b1 and b2 as a function of b and C, we can verify that Alg. 2 is (ε, 0)-DP with
ε = ε1 + ε2 =
1
b1
+
2C
b2
=
1 + (2C)1/3
b
+
(2C)2/3(1 + 2C)1/3
b
=
(1 + (2C)1/3)(1 + (2C)2/3)
b
.
This concludes the proof.
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Algorithm 3: Sparse Vector Technique ([32, Alg. 7] with ε3 = 0)
Input: dataset z, queries q1, . . . , qm, sensitivity ∆
Hyperparameters: bound C, thresholds T1, . . . , Tm, privacy parameters ε1, ε2
c← 0, w ← (⊥, . . . ,⊥) ∈ {⊥,>}m
ρ← Lap(∆/ε1)
for i ∈ [m] do
ν ← Lap(2C∆/ε2)
if qi(z) + ν ≥ Ti + ρ then
wi ← >, c← c+ 1
if c ≥ C then return w
return w
B Differentially Private Stochastic Optimization Algorithms
Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) is a simplification of gradient descent, where on each iteration
instead of computing the gradient for the entire dataset, it is instead estimated on the basis of a single
example (or small batch of examples) picked uniformly at random (without replacement) [7]. Adam
[22] is a first-order gradient-based optimization algorithm for stochastic objective functions, based on
adaptive estimates of lower-order moments.
As a privatized version of SGD, we use a mini-batched implementation with clipped gradients and
Gaussian noise similar to that of [1]. The pseudo-code is given in Alg. 4; the only difference with the
algorithm in [1] is that we sample mini-batches of a fixed size without replacement instead of using
mini-batches obtained from Poisson sampling with a fixed probability. In the pseudo-code below, the
function clipL(v) acts as the identify if ‖v‖2 ≤ L, and otherwise returns (L/‖v‖2)v. This clipping
operation ensures that ‖clipL(v)‖2 ≤ L so that the `2-sensitivity of any gradient to a change in one
datapoint in z is always bounded by L/m.
Algorithm 4: Differentially Private SGD
Input: dataset z = (z1, . . . , zn)
Hyperparameters: learning rate η, mini-batch size m, number of epochs T , noise variance σ2,
clipping norm L
Initialize w ← 0
for t ∈ [T ] do
for k ∈ [n/m] do
Sample S ⊂ [n] with |S| = m uniformly at random
Let g ← 1m
∑
j∈S clipL(∇`(zj , w)) + 2LmN (0, σ2I)
Update w ← w − ηg
return w
Our privatized version of Adam is given in Alg. 5, which uses the same gradient perturbation
technique as stochastic gradient descent. Here the notation g2 denotes the vector obtained by
squaring each coordinate of g. Adam uses three numerical constants that are not present in SGD (κ,
β1 and β2). To simplify our experiments we fixed those constants to the defaults suggested in [22].
C Experimental Setup
In all our experiments we used v† = (10, 1) as the anti-ideal point in DPARETO.
C.1 Optimization Domains
Table 2 gives the optimization domain Λ for each of the different experiments.
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Algorithm 5: Differentially Private Adam
Input: dataset z = (z1, . . . , zn)
Hyperparameters: learning rate η, mini-batch size m, number of epochs T , noise variance σ2,
clipping norm L
Fix κ← 10−8, β1 ← 0.9, β2 ← 0.999
Initialize w ← 0, µ← 0, ν ← 0, i← 0
for t ∈ [T ] do
for k ∈ [n/m] do
Sample S ⊂ [n] with |S| = m uniformly at random
Let g ← 1m
∑
j∈S clipL(∇`(zj , w)) + 2LmN (0, σ2I)
Update µ← β1µ+ (1− β1)g, ν ← β1ν + (1− β1)g2, i← i+ 1
De-bias µˆ← µ/(1− βi1), νˆ ← ν/(1− βi2)
Update w ← w − ηµˆ/(√νˆ + κ)
return w
Algorithm Dataset Epochs (T ) Lot Size (m) Learning Rate (η) Noise Variance (σ2) Clipping Norm (L)
LogReg+SGD ADULT [1, 64] [8, 512] [5e−4, 5e−2] [0.1, 16] [0.1, 4]
LogReg+Adam ADULT [1, 64] [8, 512] [5e−4, 5e−2] [0.1, 16] [0.1, 4]
SVM+SGD ADULT [1, 64] [8, 512] [5e−4, 5e−2] [0.1, 16] [0.1, 4]
MLP1+SGD MNIST [1, 400] [16, 4000] [1e−3, 5e−1] [0.1, 16] [0.1, 12]
MLP2+SGD MNIST [1, 400] [16, 4000] [1e−3, 5e−1] [0.1, 16] [0.1, 12]
Table 2: Optimization domains used in each of the experimental settings.
C.2 Random Sampling Distributions
The random sampling distributions for experiments with both MNIST and ADULT datasets were
chosen to generate as favorable results from the random samplings as possible. The distributions were
chosen both from reviewing literature – namely, [1] and [34] – as well as the authors’ experience from
training these differentially private models. We note that these distributions generated significantly
better points (with regards to characterizing the Pareto front) than naïvely sampling from the uniform
distribution.
Table 3 lists the distributions for the hyperparameters used in the MNIST experiments, and Table 4
lists the distributions for the hyperparameters used in the ADULT experiments.
Hyperparameter Base Distribution Parameters Round-to-Int Acceptable Range
Epochs Uniform a = 1, b = 400 True [1, 400]
Lot Size Normal µ = 800, σ = 800 True [16, 4000]
Learning Rate Shifted Exponential λ = 10, shift = 1e−3 False [1e−3, 5e−1]
Noise Variance Shifted Exponential λ = 5e−1, shift = 1e−1 False [1e−1, 16]
Clipping Norm Shifted Exponential λ = 5e−1, shift = 1e−1 False [1e−1, 12]
Table 3: MNIST random sampling distributions.
Hyperparameter Base Distribution Parameters Round-to-Int Acceptable Range
Epochs Uniform a = 1, b = 64 True [1, 64]
Lot Size Normal µ = 128, σ = 64 True [8, 512]
Learning Rate Shifted Exponential λ = 10, shift = 1e−3 False [1e−3, 1e−1]
Noise Variance Shifted Exponential λ = 1e−1, shift = 1e−1 False [1e−1, 16]
Clipping Norm Shifted Exponential λ = 1e−1, shift = 1e−1 False [1e−1, 4]
Table 4: ADULT random sampling distributions.
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D Further Experimental Results
DPARETO also allows us to gather information about the potential variability of the recovered Pareto
front. To that, recall that in our experiments we implemented the utility oracle by repeatedly running
algorithm Aλ with a fixed choice of hyperparameters, and then reported the average utility across
runs. Using these same runs we can also take the best and worst utilities observed for each choice of
hyperparameters. Fig. 7 displays the Pareto fronts recovered from considering the best and worst
runs in addition to the Pareto front obtained from the average over runs. In general we observe higher
variability in utility on the high privacy regime (i.e. small ε), which is to be expected since more
privacy is achieved by increasing the variance of the noise added to the computation. These type of
plots can be useful to decision-makers who want to get an idea of what variability can be expected in
practice from a particular choice of hyperparameters.
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Figure 7: Variability in the Pareto fronts recovered in Sec. 4 on the ADULT dataset.
D.1 Grid Search
For the grid search experiments we have defined parameter ranges as limits of the parameter values
from our random sampling experiment setup (see Table 4). We have tried grid size 3, which
corresponds to 243 points (approximately the same amount of points as DPARETO uses), and grid
size 4, which corresponds to 1024 points (4 times more than what we used for DPARETO). As can be
seen in Fig. 8, DPARETO clearly outperformed grid search.
E Implementation Details
E.1 DPARETO
Hyperparameter optimization was implemented with GPFlowOpt library [24] which offers GP-based
Bayesian optimization, as well as the HVPoI acquisition function.
Transformed Output Domains The output domain for accuracy is [0, 1], which would clearly not
be modeled well by a GP that models outputs on the entire real line. The output domain for privacy
is on the real line, but it is expressed on a logarithmic scale. Hence, in both cases we transform the
outputs, so that we are modeling a GP with Gaussian noise in the transformed space. For accuracy,
we use a logit transform logit(x) = log(x) − log(1 − x) which transforms values from [0, 1] to
[−∞,+∞]. For privacy, we use a simple log transform. Note that it is possible to use Warped GPs
[40], where the transformation is learnt. Concretely this amounts to adding an additional Jacobian
term to the likelihood function that takes the transformation into account. The advantage of this
approach is that the form of both the covariance matrix and the nonlinear transformation are learnt
simultaneously under the same probabilistic framework. However, for simplicity and efficiency we
choose to use fixed transformations.
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Figure 8: Results of the grid search experiment compared to BO approach used in DPARETO.
E.2 Machine Learning Algorithms and Moments Accountant
Machine learning models used in the paper are implemented with Apache MXNet [10]. We have made
use of the high-level Gluon API whenever possible. However, the privacy accountant implementation
that we used (see [43]) required low-level changes to the definitions of the models. In order to keep
the continuous MXNet execution graph to ensure a fast evaluation of the model, we reverted to the
pure MXNet model definitions. Even though this approach requires much more effort to implement
the models themselves, it allows for more fine-grained control of how the model is executed, as well
as provides a natural way of implementing privacy accounting.
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